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COUGHING UP THE CASH: SHOULD MEDICAID 
PROVIDE FOR INDEPENDENT STATE RECOVERY 
AGAINST THIRD-PARTY TORTFEASORS SUCH AS 
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY? 
Michael K. Mahoney* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Public opposition to cigarette smoking is at an all-time high in the 
United States. Though at one time questioned, now irrefutable evi-
dence of both its addictive nature and its link to deadly disease have 
spurred feelings of frustration, outrage, and betrayal from smokers 
and non-smokers alike. As a result, individual smokers since the 1950's 
have continued to file private suits against the tobacco industry based 
upon several common law theories.! Unfortunately, courts have not 
looked favorably on these claims. Citing problems of causation, lack 
of defendants' knowledge regarding smoking's dangers, and the 
strength of the assumption of risk defense, courts consistently have 
excused the tobacco industry for the harms it allegedly has caused 
millions of Americans for decades.2 
* Articles Editor, 1996-1997, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW. 
1 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 543 (3d Cir. 1986); Albright v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341, 351 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 
1973), eert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974); Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541, 544 
(5th Cir. 1970); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406, 411 (M.D. Pa. 1960); Cooper 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1956), on remand, 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. 
Mass. 1957), ajj'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958). 
2 See, e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 76-77 (5th Cir. 1962) (discussing 
smoker's and manufacturer's knowledge of dangers of smoking); Albright, 350 F. Supp at 351 
(discussing problems of causation); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 134 F. Supp. 829, 
836 (W.D. Pa. 1955) (discussing possibility that plaintiff may have assumed risk by smoking). 
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Despite courts' relative indifference toward the plight of smokers, 
state governments recently have thrown their hat into the ring as 
well. The discovery of internal tobacco industry documents allegedly 
recounting the industry's intentional misrepresentation, fraud, and 
deceit3 has, over the past year, spurred several states to file suits 
against the nation's largest tobacco manufacturers.4 Though each 
state pursues varying theories of recovery, all the states share a 
common goal: recouping the tens of millions of dollars that each has 
spent in treating its citizens' smoking-related illnesses via medical 
assistance programs like Medicaid.5 The state suits are not class ac-
tions filed on behalf of smokers, but instead actions filed for the benefit 
of all citizens whose tax dollars are spent disproportionately caring 
for harms that the tobacco industry allegedly has caused.6 
The states' seemingly smooth road to recovery may encounter only 
a single barrier. That barrier is Medicaid legislation that governs the 
states' ability to recoup damages caused by third-party tortfeasors 
like the tobacco industry.7 Though ambiguous, the statutory language 
delineating the appropriate methods of recovery arguably forbids the 
states' "independent" recovery, instead limiting them to "subrogated" 
claims. An equitable remedy allowing one party to "stand in the shoes 
of" another harmed party, subrogation bestows upon the intervening 
party all the privileges and burdens of the harmed party.8 Most fre-
quently associated with the insurance industry, subrogation allows 
not only the intervener to pursue any claim the harmed party may 
have, but also the tortfeasor to present any affirmative defenses 
originally applicable against the harmed party.9 
It is upon this statutory ambiguity that the tobacco industry hopes 
to capitalize. By characterizing the states' Medicaid programs as pri-
vate health insurers and presenting principles of statutory construc-
tion, the tobacco industry attempts to limit the states to subrogated 
claims.10 If this attempt is successful, the tobacco industry would be 
entitled to present against the states the same affirmative defenses 
3 Stanton A. Glantz, Looking Through a Keyhole at the 7bbacco Industry, 274 JAMA 219,223 
(1994) (citing P.J. Hilts, 7bbacco Company Was Silent On Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,1994, 
at AI). 
4 Maria Shao, 7bbacco Firm Agrees to Settle Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, March 14, 1996, at 6. 
5 Graham Kelder, Once More Unto the Breach, ToBACCO ON TRlAL (Tobacco Control Resource 
Center, Boston, Mass.), Jan. 1995, at 1. 
6 See id. at 2. 
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(25)(A)(1994); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 11SE, § 22 (1993). 
8 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE, §§ 61:1, 61:116 (1983). 
9Id. at § 61:212 
10 See Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 
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that have proven so successful in the private realm. ll To stave off such 
a characterization, the states not only present their own theories of 
statutory construction, but also analogize the Medicaid legislation to 
federal statutes allowing the government's independent recovery.12 
This Comment examines the Medicaid statute's subrogation issue 
in the context of the states' suits, and then offers a basis for conclud-
ing that the statute does not limit the states to subrogated claims. 
Section II provides a brief outline of smoking's harmful effects on both 
human health and the federal Medicaid program. Section III describes 
the various states' claims against the tobacco industry. Section IV 
provides a general introduction to subrogation and its role in Medicaid 
legislation. Regarding the states' suits, this section lays out each side's 
arguments as to why this legislation should, or should not, restrict the 
states to subrogated claims. Finally, section V of this Comment parses 
through those arguments-concluding that the courts, Congress and 
policy all dictate that the states rightfully can avoid subrogation and 
sue the tobacco industry independently. 
II. SMOKING AND MEDICAID 
A. Health Effects of Smoking 
Deemed "the most important preventable cause of . . . premature 
mortality in the United States," cigarette smoking kills untold num-
bers each and every year.13 In the United States, forty-eight million 
people label themselves as "smokers," and purchase over twenty-four 
billion packages of cigarettes annually.14 All tolled, smoking causes 
400,000 people to die every year, a total exceeding the combined 
deaths caused by automobile accidents, AIDS, alcohol use, use of 
illegal drugs, homicide, suicide, and fires. 15 
12-17, Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., (No. 94-8565)(Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, 1994) 
[hereinafter Defendant's Brief Minn.J. 
11 See COUCH, supra note 8, at § 61:212. 
12 See Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Challenges to the Sufficiency 
of the Complaint and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Chancery Court at ~ 49-51, Mike 
Moore, Attorney General ex. rei., State of Mississippi v. The American Tobacco Co., (No. 
94-1429) (Miss. Ch. Ct., Jackson County, 1994) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Brief Miss.J. 
13 See Medical-Care Expenditures Attributable to Cigarette Smoking-United States, 1993, 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, Wash., D.C.), July 8, 1994, at 469 [hereinafter Medical-Care ExpendituresJ. 
14 See id. 
15 See Plaintiff's Complaint at 7, Massachusetts v. Philip Morris, Inc., (No. 95-7378) (Mass. 
Super. Ct., Middlesex County, 1995) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Complaint Mass.J. 
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The staggering number of deaths attributable to cigarette smoking 
stems primarily from the great variety of illnesses caused by the 
activity itself. Though tobacco advocates likely would argue other-
wise, the causal relationship between smoking and disease is as well 
established as any other in modern medicine.I6 Most notable perhaps 
are the several forms of cancer found among smokers. Cigarette 
smoking causes more than eighty-five percent of all lung cancer, which 
now has surpassed breast cancer as the primary cause of death from 
cancer among American women.I7 Smoking also induces cancers of the 
mouth, larynx, esophagus, stomach, pancreas, uterus, cervix, kidney, 
and colon.I8 Along with cancer, smoking also gives rise to eighty 
percent of deaths from pulmonary diseases like emphysema and bron-
chitis.I9 In addition, there are the thousands of heart attacks, strokes, 
and cases of both vascular disease and aortic aneurysm attributable 
to cigarette smoking.20 
B. A "Medicaid" Overview 
Who bears the financial costs of treating these illnesses? Histori-
cally the smoker did, paying such expenses either out-of-pocket or 
through a private insurance company with whom the smoker held a 
contractual agreement.21 Given the excessive financial costs of medical 
care, the poor saw physicians less than others, or faced serious finan-
cial difficulties in paying for the care they did receive.22 Consequently, 
the government, through a variety of programs, has tapped public 
funds to cover the medical expenses of millions of indigent American 
smokers. 
Most notable among these programs, perhaps, is Medicaid. Estab-
lished in 1965, Medicaid is a government-run program of medical 
assistance for impoverished individuals who are aged, blind, disabled, 
16 See Raymond E. Gangarosa, Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for the 
Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Thbacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 81, 113 n.161 (1994) (citing Surgeon General's Report, 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS 
(summarizing the progression of evidence leading to current understanding of smoking haz-
ards». 
17 See Plaintiff's Complaint Mass., supra note 15, at 7-8. 
18Id. at 8. 
19Id. 
'/JJId. 
21 See Diane Rowland, Medicaid at 30: New Challenges for the Nation's Health Safety Net, 
274 JAMA 271, 271 (1995). 
22 Id. 
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or members of families with dependent children.23 During the past 
thirty years, Medicaid (and its companion Medicare)24 has provided 
the nation's most vulnerable and illness-prone groups access to health 
services.25 Jointly financed by federal and state governments, Medi-
caid is administered largely by states within broad federal guidelines 
regarding the scope of services, provider payment levels, and popu-
lation groups eligible for coverage.26 Under this system, the recipient 
freely chooses among participating health care providers and then 
asks the state to reimburse that provider for services renderedP 
This payment system has made Medicaid one of the most popular, 
and thus most costly, government programs in existence today. Since 
its enactment, Medicaid membership has grown tremendously: from 
nineteen million members in 1972 to nearly thirty-five million in 
1994.28 Today, nearly thirteen percent of the American population 
receives some health coverage from the government via Medicaid.29 
Not surprisingly, such staggering membership increases have placed 
a significant financial strain on federal and state governments alike.so 
At the federal level, this growth has forced the government to become 
the nation's "single largest payer for health care services" -with 
payments totalling $272 billion annually.3! Specifically, Medicaid alone 
has cost the government upwards of $125 billion annually, accounting 
for nearly six percent of the entire federal budget.32 At the state level, 
pressure from the federal government, courts, and even state legisla-
tures has forced Medicaid planners to increase coverage for pregnant 
23 Medicaid Eligibility-Services, 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) '1/14,010 (Feb. 10, 1994) 
[hereinafter Medicaid Eligibility-Services]. 
24 Enacted alongside Medicaid as part of the Social Security Act, Medicare provides basic 
health care funding to individuals over the age of 65. See Nancy De Lew, The First 30 Years of 
Medicare and Medicaid, 274 JAMA 262, 263 (1995). 
25 [d. 
26 See id. at 265. Typically, a particular state's Medicaid plan provides its recipients with 
hospital services, health center and ambulatory services, laboratorylX-Ray services, screening 
and diagnosis, and physician services. See Medicaid Eligibility-Services, supra note 23, at 
~ 14,010. 
'ZI [d. 
28 De Lew, supra note 24, at 262. Between 1985 and 1993 alone, expansion of coverage to 
include pregnant women and families whose income was up to 133% of the poverty level added 
11 million Americans to the program. See id. at 262, 265. 
29 See id. at 262. 
30 See id. at 263. 
31 See id. Medicare and Medicaid spending represents 31 % of all health spending in the United 
States, 41% of all hospital spending, 28% of all physician spending, and 61% of all nursing home 
spending. See id. 
32 See Rowland, supra note 21, at 272. 
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women, children, individuals with disabilities, and the low-income 
uninsured.33 This rapid spending growth predictably has outpaced 
that of federal, state, and local revenue.34 Consequently, a "growing 
share of public spending has been devoted to . . . Medicaid each 
year."35 Today, "Medicaid has grown to be the second largest expen-
diture item in state budgets," exhausting nearly twenty percent of 
state general revenue spending annually.36 
Not surprisingly, tobacco use has played a major role in draining 
both the federal and state governments of vital resources. Along with 
diseases involving alcohol abuse, "tobacco-related diseases are the 
most common disorders found among hospitalized populations and 
disproportionately affect low-income, medically indigent [individu-
als]."37 At the same time, these individuals are among the most intense 
users of emergency medical services, one of the most expensive serv-
ices in the health care system.38 A 1987 study of the medical care costs 
attributable to smoking revealed that $21.9 billion is spent annually 
in treating smoking-related illnesses like cancer, heart disease, and 
stroke.39 Of this amount, Medicaid payments alone accounted for over 
ten percent.40 A report by the University of California and the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimated that in 1993, 
smoking-related illnesses cost United States taxpayers a total of ap-
proximately $50 billion.4l Though such huge figures and percentages 
are staggering, looking at a single pack of cigarettes perhaps best 
captures tobacco's enormous impact on Medicaid spending.42 For each 
of the twenty-four billion packs of cigarettes sold each year, society 
spent approximately $2.06 on medical care for illnesses attributable 
to smoking.43 Of that amount, the government alone paid $.89 through 
public programs like Medicaid.44 
33 See id. 
34 De Lew, supra note 24, at 263. While health care spending in the United States increased 
by 12% generally between 1970-1992, Medicaid spending increased at a faster rate-16% during 
that same period. [d. 
35 [d. 
36 See Trish Riley, Medicaid: The Role of the States, 274 JAMA 267, 268 (1995). 
37 Gangarosa, supra note 16, at 87. 
38 [d. at 87, 88. 
39 See Medical-Care Expenditures, supra note 13, at 470. 
40 [d. at 469. 
41 [d. at 470. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
44 See Medical-Care Expenditures, supra note 13, at 470. To rebut this argument, tobacco 
advocates cite numerous economic analyses suggesting that tobacco actually saves states money 
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III. STATE LAWSUITS 
Realizing the severe damage smoking-related illnesses are inflict-
ing on Medicaid and the entire health care system, states have de-
cided to take matters into their own hands.45 Since 1995, fifteen states, 
including Minnesota, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, West Virginia 
and Massachusetts have filed lawsuits against the tobacco industry46 
in an attempt to force it to take responsibility for the financial harms 
associated with smoking.47 Unlike past suits against the tobacco in-
dustry, these suits are not class actions brought on behalf of smokers.48 
Rather, the suits are actions brought on behalf of state taxpayers, 
smokers and non-smokers alike, whose dollars, the states contend, 
have been disproportionately spent caring for individuals whom to-
bacco companies have allegedly injured.49 The goal the states share is 
to recoup the hundreds of millions of dollars that the states have 
due to the frequent pre-mature deaths caused by smoking. Gangarosa, supra note 16, at 85 n.19 
(citing Jonathan Marshall, Smokers Paying Their Own Way, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 29,1994, at Dl). 
Specifically, they argue that because smokers typically die young, states do not have to make 
as many social security or Medicare payments over the long run. Id. They further claim that 
the relatively quick deaths stemming from smoking-related illnesses like heart disease and 
stroke free the states from expenses associated with individuals "hanging on" in nursing homes 
or other long-term facilities. Id. 
45 See Kelder, supra note 5, at 1. 
46 Id. Tobacco manufacturers originally named as defendants include: Philip Morris, Inc.; R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation; B.A.T. Industries P.L.C.; 
Lorillard Tobacco Co.; Liggett Group, Inc.; New England Wholesale Tobacco Co., Inc.; and 
Albert H. Notini & Sons, Inc. See Plaintiff's Complaint Mass., supra note 15, at 1. Also named 
as defendants were tobacco industry groups including The Council for Tobacco Research -
U.S.A., Inc. and The Tobacco Institute, Inc. Id. 
47 See Kelder, supra note 5, at 1. { 
48 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 543 tad Cir. 1986); Albright v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341, 348 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974); Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541, 544 
(5th Cir. 1970); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406, 410 (M.D. Pa. 1960); Cooper 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1956), on remand, 158 F. Supp. 22, 22 
(D. Mass. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958). 
49 Frank Phillips, State 7b Sue Over Costs of Smoking, BOSTON GLOBE, March 15, 1995, at 13. 
In March 1996, Liggett Group-the smallest of the nation's five major tobacco companies-an-
nounced that it would settle its part of both a major private class action suit brought on behalf 
of smokers nationwide and the states' Medicaid reimbursement suits. See Martin Shao, Mass. 
Moves to Ink Pact, BOSTON GLOBE, March 15, 1996, at 33, 37. Under the settlement agreement, 
Florida, Mississippi, Minnesota, West Vrrginia and Massachusetts would split $5 million up front. 
Id. The states then would also share a settlement equivalent to 2.5% a year of Liggett's pre-tax 
profit during the next twenty-five years. Id. The agreement would also serve as an invitation 
to other states to sue the tobacco industry and simultaneously settle with Liggett. Id. New 
states that sued would be eligible for proceeds from Liggett based upon a similar pre-tax profit 
formula.Id. 
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expended in caring for Medicaid recipients suffering from smoking 
related illnesses.5o In addition, the states seek a permanent injunction 
requiring the tobacco industry to disclose all of its research on smok-
ing to the public, to fund an educational program detailing the health 
consequences of smoking and, finally, to fund smoking cessation pro-
grams for nicotine-dependent smokers.51 
A. General Courses of Action 
Though they share the common goal of receiving compensation 
from the tobacco industry, the lawsuits filed by the individual states 
vary significantly in the specific means chosen to achieve that goal. 
State statutory authority has forced each of the plaintiff states to 
pursue only those theories of recovery offering the most promise. In 
Florida, for example, the Attorney General enjoys broad authority to 
bring suit under the state's Third Party Medicaid Liability Act, a 
statute specifically authorizing the state to seek reimbursement for 
Medicaid-generated medical expenses "independent of any rights of 
causes of action of the recipient[s]" themselves.52 More importantly, 
that statute provides that the affirmative defenses traditionally relied 
upon by the tobacco companies like comparative negligence and as-
sumption of the risk are "to be abrogated to the extent necessary to 
ensure full recovery."53 Minnesota, bringing suit jointly with Blue 
CrosslBlue Shield of Minnesota, has based many of its claims on the 
state's Anti-Trust and Consumer Protection Laws.54 The vast major-
50 See Phillips, supra note 49, at 13. 
51 See id. 
52 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(6) (West 1994). 
53 Id. § 409.910(1). Enacted in the summer of 1994, this statute specifically creates a new cause 
of action for Medicaid reimbursement. Graham Kelder, Medical Cost Reimbursement Suits 
Comprise Second Front in the Third Wave of Thbacco Litigation, ToBACCO ON TRIAL (Tobacco 
Control Resource Center, Boston, Mass.), Feb. 1995, at 13 [hereinafter Kelder II]. In short, it 
recognizes an injury to the states separate and distinct from the injuries to smokers themselves. 
Id. "On June 30, 1994, Philip Morris, along with several business groups, filed a preemptive 
constitutional challenge to Florida's Medicaid Third Party Liability Act." Id. at 15. The com-
plaint "alleges that the Act removes affirmative defenses and other basic protections of the 
common law and virtually guarantees arbitrary and excessive liability." Id. The complaint also 
charges that the Act was passed as a "stealth amendment without sufficient discussion and that 
it violated several provisions of the Florida and United States Constitutions, including due 
process." Id. at 14-15. 
54 See Plaintiff's Complaint at P. 89-126, Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., (No.94-8565) (Minn. 
Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, 1994) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Complaint Minn.]. On August 17, 1994, 
Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey III filed suit in Minnesota state court. 
Kelder II, supra note 53, at 13. Private Insurer Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota joined 
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ity of other states, like Mississippi, West Virginia, Louisiana, and 
Massachusetts have relied upon a plethora of common law theories in 
their attempt to gain monetary and injunctive relief from the tobacco 
industry. 
B. The Common Law Suits 
In their lawsuits against the tobacco industry, the states relying on 
common law claim a variety of violations. First, they argue that the 
tobacco industry breached a special duty of care that it undertook 
voluntarily. 55 Specifically, the states argue that the defendant tobacco 
industry professed to have a "special responsibility," to those "who 
advance and protect the public health," to make all possible efforts to 
discover the truth about smoking and health. 56 In short, the states 
seek to show that the tobacco industry's utter failure to use due care 
in performing that voluntary duty has "increased the risk of harm to 
the public and the cost of health care .... "67 Consequently, the states 
contend, it is the tobacco industry that should bear that cost.58 
the State of Minnesota as co-plaintiffs, seeking reimbursement for its share of tobacco-related 
health care costs. [d. at 13-14. 
56 See Plaintiff's CO'/'nplaint Mass., supra note 15, at 66. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. at 67. 
58 See id. at 3. The states offer much evidence to support this claim. [d. at 13-16. In the 
mid-1950's, shortly after the first study associating cigarette smoke with cancer was released, 
the major manufacturers agreed to create a trade association known as the Tobacco Industry 
Research Committee (TIRC), later known as the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR). [d. at 
15. Shortly thereafter, the tobacco manufacturers made "an unambiguous pledge" to the public 
representing that ''through TIRC, the tobacco industry would conduct and report objective and 
unbiased research regarding smoking and health." [d. at 16. Entitled "A Frank Statement to 
Cigarette Smokers," this pledge appeared in 448 newspapers nationwide. See id. at 16. Included 
were statements by tobacco manufacturers that: 
We accept an interest in people's health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every 
other consideration in our business .... We always have and always will cooperate 
closely with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health .... We are pledging 
aid and assistance to the research and effort into all phases of tobacco use and health 
.... This statement is being issued because we believe the people are entitled to know 
where we stand on this matter and what we intend to do about it. 
[d. at 22-23. According to the complaint filed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, TIRC 
not only knowingly suppressed studies linking smoking to disease and addiction, but affirma-
tively led the public to believe that no affirmative link between smoking and ill-health exists. 
See id. at 19-20. This trend of deception began early. See id. at 19. Even before it convincingly 
concluded in the "Frank Statement" that "there is no proof that cigarette smoking is one of the 
causes" of lung cancer, the tobacco industry became aware of a Lorillard chemist's study 
concluding that, "UJust enough evidence has been presented to justify the possibility ... that 
the use of tobacco contributes to cancer development in susceptible people." [d. at 17, 19. Later, 
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Second, the states seek to hold the tobacco industry liable under a 
breach of warranty theory. The states claim that the tobacco compa-
nies' affirmations and promises regarding the minimal health effects 
of its product constitute an express warranty upon which Medicaid 
recipients relied in deciding both to begin and to continue smoking.59 
At the same time, the states claim that the tobacco industry breached 
its implied warranty of merchantability by exposing to the public a 
product that is unfit when used for its intended purposes.60 
Third, the states argue that the tobacco industry "entered into an 
agreement for the unlawful purpose of suppressing and concealing ... 
information concerning smoking, addiction and diseases."61 Carried 
out primarily by the Tobacco Industry Research Council (TIRC, later 
known as CTR), this alleged conspiracy enabled each manufacturer 
to take the position that no link whatsoever existed between cigarette 
smoking and ill-health.62 According to the states, such a position was 
feasible only because the trade associations had suppressed (any) 
independent reports about smoking or had diminished significantly 
a 1961 confidential memorandum from a consulting research firm hired by Liggett stated that 
"[the] biologically active materials present in cigarette tobacco ... are ... cancer causing [and] 
cancer promoting." [d. at 22. These findings contrast sharply with the information Liggett later 
provided to the Surgeon General in 1963. See id. at 23. Withholding completely the findings of 
its consultants, Liggett instead "focused on alternative causes of disease, such as air pollution, 
coffee and alcohol consumption, diet, lack of exercise, and genetics." See id. 
69 See id. at 68. 
60 See Plaintiff's Complaint Mass., supra note 15, at 68, 69. Regarding the expressed war-
ranty, the state may point to the wealth of advertising and other public statements made on 
behalf of the tobacco industry denying that smoking contains any health risks whatsoever. See 
id. at 24-26. Published in 1970, one such statement concluded in part that, "[a]fter millions of 
dollars and over 20 years of research: The Question about smoking and health is still a question." 
See id. at 25. More recently, CTR Scientific Director Sheldon Sommers testified before Congress 
that: "Cigarette smoking has not been scientifically established to be a cause of chronic diseases 
.... Nor has it been shown to affect pregnancy outcome adversely." See id. at 26-27. 
Regarding the implied warranty, the states will likely point to evidence establishing that the 
tobacco manufacturers ''knew or should have known through information within their control 
that their cigarettes were defective and unreasonably dangerous if used in the manner intended 
.... " See id. at 68. For the most part, this evidence takes the form of internal memoranda 
circulated within individual manufacturers' hierarchy, acknowledging the dangers of smoking 
cigarettes. See id. at 19-22. A 1958 memorandum sent to the then-Vice President of Research 
at Philip Morris, for example, conceded that, "the evidence ... is building that heavy cigarette 
smoking contributes to lung cancer . . . ." See id. at 20. Similarly, in 1961, Philip Morris's 
Research and Development Division authored a company report in which one section was 
subtitled, "Reduction of Carcinogens in Smoke." See id. 
6! See id. at 69. 
62 See id. at 69-70. 
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their influence on the public.63 Consequently, the states claim that 
government regulators were misled and deceived regarding smok-
ing's true dangers, thereby preventing proper assessment of the haz-
ards presented by cigarette use.64 
Fourth, the states claim that they deserve reimbursement based 
upon theories of restitution and unjust enrichment. Specifically, the 
states argue that the tobacco industry "assumed and owe[s] a duty to 
pay for the harm caused by their wrongful conduct," but "have re-
peatedly refused to do SO."65 According to the states, this breach of 
responsibility has forced the states to "expend substantial sums of 
money to pay for the harm caused by the wrongful conduct of defen-
dants."66 At the same time, the tobacco industry has "reaped substan-
tial profits" from cigarette sales stemming from its allegedly wrongful 
conduct.67 The tobacco industry, the states contend, "in ... equity and 
fairness" ought to have borne these costs.68 
This contention, along with the others the states have advanced, 
represent the sole means by which the states seek to recoup the 
millions they have spent in treating smoking-related illnesses.69 The 
states request relief in the form of "compensation . . . for past and 
future damages, including but not limited to health care expenditures, 
caused by the defendants' actions .... "70 Arguably distinct from that 
suffered by the smokers themselves, the harm the states have suf-
fered is purely financial.71 Such direct harm at the hands of the tobacco 
63 See Plaintiffs Complaint at 61, Florida v. The American 1bbacco Company, (No. 95-
1466AO) (Fla. Cir. Ct., Palm Beach County, 1995) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Complaint Fla.]. 
64 See id. To a great extent, the state will rely on recently revealed internal documents to 
demonstrate that the joint industry research undertaken by TIRC/CTR was not objective, but 
instead "designed ... to promote" favorable research and, at the same time, suppress or attack 
any negative results. See Plaintiff's Complaint Mass., supra note 15, at 29. One former em-
ployee of TIRC referred to it as "just a lobbying thing," while a leading tobacco industry official 
labelled the organization "the best and cheapest insurance the tobacco industry can buy." See 
id. at 31. In one instance, a scientist contracted by CTR to conduct research was "directed away 
from research that might add to the evidence against smoking." See id. at 32. Another mecha-
nism employed by CTR to suppress adverse research results involved having lawyers present 
during studies so that the attorney/client privilege would protect against disclosure. See id. 
at 33. 
65 Plaintiff's Complaint Mass., supra note 15, at 71. 
66 [d. 
67 [d. at 72. 
68 [d. 
69 See id. at 66--74. 
70 See Plaintiff's Complaint Mass., supra note 15, at 73--74. 
71 See id. at 2, 3. 
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industry, the states argue, justifies legal action that is likewise distinct 
from action taken by smokers.72 Whether courts should allow this 
distinction constitutes the thrust of this Comment. 
IV. SUBROGATION: THE STICKY ISSUE 
The states' ability to litigate successfully the tobacco industry's 
alleged wrongs depends on a variety of factors. First and foremost, 
however, the states must establish the legitimacy of the very type of 
action they have chosen to bring. Their decision to sue on behalf of 
taxpayers rather than on behalf of the smokers themselves presents 
courts with a novel, and thus difficult question. Does federal and state 
Medicaid legislation authorize the states to leap-frog the smokers and 
sue independently for the financial harms that they have suffered?73 
Courts' resolution of this issue very likely will have a profound 
impact on the suits' outcomes. If courts find that the Medicaid legis-
lation warrants an independent action, the states will get the oppor-
tunity to prove their respective theories of recovery. If courts find 
such an action beyond the legislation's scope, however, the states will 
suffer a damaging, if not fatal, blow to their cause. In the latter 
scenario, courts likely would not terminate the suit entirely, but in-
stead would limit the states to proceeding under the legal principle of 
"subrogation."74 Citing courts' past characterization of the Medicaid 
program75 and principles of statutory construction,76 the tobacco in-
dustry argues that Medicaid legislation expressly limits the states to 
"subrogated" claims.77 In response, the states offer their own princi-
ples of statutory construction78 as well as an analogy to other medical 
care legislation. In doing so, the states seek to demonstrate that they 
are not limited to subrogated claims, but instead are entitled under 
Medicaid legislation to bring an independent recovery action.79 
72 See id. 
73 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 118E, § 22 (1993). 
74 Subrogation is "the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a 
lawful claim, demand or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the debt or claim, and 
its rights, remedies or securities." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (6th ed. 1990). 
75 Defendants' Brief Minn., supra note 10, at 12. 
76 See id. at 16 (citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1978». 
77 See id. at 14. 
78 See Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 9--10, 
Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., (No.94-8565) (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, 1994) [herein-
after Plaintiff's Brief Minn]. 
79 See Plaintiff's Brief Miss., sU'fYI"a note 12, at ~ 49--51. 
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A. Subrogation Overview 
Subrogation offers the suing party the rare opportunity to step into 
the shoes of another in seeking recovery from a wrongdoer.80 Gener-
ally speaking, subrogation is an equitable principle designed to allow 
an intervener to recover payments from the wrongdoer the inter-
vener made to, or on behalf of, an injured party for a harm caused by 
the wrongdoer.81 Subrogation permits the general transfer of rights 
to the intervener from the party declining to pursue legal action.82 
Designed to compel the ultimate payment by the party who "in all 
good conscience ought to pay,"83 subrogation is broad enough to in-
clude almost any instance where equity dictates repayment, but at 
the same time is sufficiently narrow to prohibit recovery where inter-
vening parties have acted as mere volunteers.84 
To achieve its overarching goal of fairness, subrogation bestows 
upon the intervening party (the subrogee) burdens and privileges 
typically associated with stepping into the shoes of the injured party 
(the subrogor).85 Regarding the privileges, the subrogee is entitled to 
enforce any right that the subrogor would have enjoyed had the 
subrogor decided to bring suit.86 This entitlement exists because, for 
80 See COUCH, supra note 8, § 61:114. To gain a better understanding of the concept of 
subrogation, consider the following, all too common scenario: 
Driver "D" speeds through an intersection and hits another car, injuring its driver "P." 
Instead of bringing suit directly against D, P chooses to simply collect from his own insurer "T." 
Having expended significant funds for an action in which it played no part whatsoever, T 
logically seeks reimbursement from D (or D's own insurance company) the party whose wrong-
doing lead indirectly to T's loss. 
T's ability to receive repayment of the funds it expended stems directly from the principle of 
subrogation. In most instances like this one, the credit which T hopes to receive for its actions 
generally enjoys neither privilege nor security-meaning that T exposes himself to the risk of 
never receiving repayment. See Saul Litvinoff, Subrogation, 50 LA. L. REV. 1140, 1146 (1990). 
For that reason alone, T acquires through subrogation the cause of action that originally 
belonged to the harmed party P whom T originally paid. See id. As a result, T is assured of 
reimbursement from D in a way considerably more effective than any personal action that may 
arise from its simple act of performing for the benefit of another party. See id. 
81 David D. Smith, Medicare Subrogation and Third Party Liability: A Practice Primer for 
the Perplexed Practitioner, 21 GoNZ. L. REV. 155, 160 (1985--86). 
82 HENRY SHELDON, THE LAW OF SUBROGATION 2 (1893). 
83 Smith, supra note 81, at 160 (citing 73 AM. JUR. 2D Subrogation § 1 (1974 & Supp. 1984». 
84 SHELDON, supra note 82, at 2-3. Specifically, subrogation applies to reimburse only those 
who have been compelled to pay the debt of another person. Instances where individuals acted 
for the sole purpose of assisting another, or of making a gift to another do not entitle those 
individuals to reimbursement. Litvinoff, supra note 80, at 1145. 
85 COUCH, supra note 8, § 61:114. 
80 [d. 
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legal purposes, the subrogee and the subrogor succeeding him or her 
constitute "one and the same."87 
Just as a subrogee is entitled to the beneficial rights possessed by 
the subrogor, equity likewise dictates that the subrogee be burdened 
with the detriments accompanying the subrogor's claim.88 Thus, 
where the subrogor faces a limitation of liability that diminishes or 
precludes recovery from a wrongdoer, the subrogee also would face 
the same limitation in bringing the suit.89 This principle was first put 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in St. Louis Iron Mountain 
and Southern Railway Company v. Commercial Union Insurance 
CO .. 90 In that case, an insurance company sought to recover funds from 
a railroad company after a fire destroyed bales of cotton belonging to 
an individual covered by the insurance company.91 Though the Court 
found the defendant railroad company negligent in not furnishing 
adequate transportation to the insured individual, the railroad's lack 
of control over the cotton at the time of the fire freed it from liability 
to the insured individual.92 In holding that the insurance company was 
acting as subrogee, and therefore had no claim against the railroad, 
the Court reasoned that "the insurer can take nothing by subrogation 
but the rights of the assured; and if the [as]sured has no right of 
action, none passes to the insurer."93 
This reasoning could have a profound effect on the states' suits 
against the tobacco industry. In short, courts finding that Medicaid 
87 SHELDON, supra note 82, at 3. Thus, in the aforementioned example, T would be able to 
argue the same theories of liability (negligence, battery) as P would have, despite the fact that 
T had no direct knowledge of or involvement in the incident. T's relative isolation from the actual 
events surrounding D's potential liability presents no barrier once P subrogates his claim to T, 
for equity dictates that true substitution of rights must include all the benefits that accompany 
that right. 
88 COUCH, supra note 8, § 61:116. 
89 See id. 
90 139 U.S. 223, 235 (1891). 
91 [d. at 224. 
92 See id. at 238. 
93 [d. at 235. A better illustration of this principle may lie in a variation of the aforementioned 
hypothetical scenario involving T, P and D. If, in a hypothetical suit filed directly by P against 
D, D could establish that P was not wearing his much-needed eyeglasses at the time of the 
collision, the court would most likely find P contributorily negligent in the incident and thus, 
reduce (if not completely eliminate) his recovery. For that very reason, T's actual subrogated 
claim against D under the same factual circumstances would yield a similar recovery simply 
because, as a rule, a subrogated claim can reap no more than that which a direct action would 
have reaped. COUCH, supra note 8, § 61:116. Though T had indirectly suffered harm at the hands 
of the wrongdoer D, his decision to stand in P's shoes forces him to endure the tenuous position 
those shoes. 
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legislation restricts the states to subrogated claims made on behalf of 
smokers would allow the tobacco industry to employ the assumption 
of risk defense-a defense that has proven very successful in the 
private sphere.94 If, on the other hand, courts find that Medicaid 
legislation authorizes the states to seek reimbursement outside of 
subrogation, these defenses would be inapplicable. As both the to-
bacco industry and the states realize, courts' interpretation regarding 
subrogation could very likely dictate the outcome of these suits. 
B. Tobacco Industry Arguments 
1. States as Private Insurers 
In the eyes of the tobacco industry, common sense mandates that a 
jury never hear the states' potentially damaging claims. Though the 
surrounding circumstances are significantly more complex than those 
involving the aforementioned fender-bender,95 the structure of the 
states' lawsuits against the tobacco industry is analogous. According 
to tobacco industry advocates, the states are pursuing nothing more 
than a "giant subrogation case," where they are essentially acting 
as private health insurers via the Medicaid program.96 Using this 
apparent similarity and the enforcement provisions of federal and 
state Medicaid legislation,97 the tobacco industry seeks to prove not 
only that courts should, but also must, deem the states' suits subro-
gated.98 
The tobacco industry first argues that the states' "insurer-insured" 
relationship with Medicaid recipients immediately places this case 
within the realm of subrogation.99 In doing so, the industry first cites 
to multiple cases in which courts indirectly have equated a state's 
Medicaid program to the typical private sector health insurance pol-
icy.100 One such case the tobacco industry cites is Witherspoon v. St. 
94 See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 134 F. Supp. 829, 833 (W.D. Pa. 1955). 
95 See Hypothetical, supra note 80. 
96 See Defendants' Brief In Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 
5 n.2, Mike Moore, Attorney General, ex. rel. State of Mississippi v. The American Tobacco 
Company, et al. (No.94--1429) (Miss. Ch. Ct., Jackson County, 1994) [hereinafter Defendants' 
Brief Miss.]. 
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994); MASS. GEN. L. ch. U8E, § 22 (1993). 
98 Defendants' Brief Miss., supra note 96, at 6. 
99 See id. at 12. 
100 See id. (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1993); Witherspoon v. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 548 P.2d 302, 309 (Wash. 1976». 
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Paul Fire & Marine Insurance CO.101 There, the Supreme Court of 
Washington was forced to decide whether Medicare benefits qualified 
for certain exclusions under an individual's private health insurance 
policy.102 In doing so, as tobacco advocates point out, the court con-
cluded that "[t]he size and scope of the federal government's Medicare 
and Medicaid programs have made it the largest health insurer in the 
United States."I03 Another more recent case upon which the tobacco 
industry relies is Travelers Insurance Company v. Cuomo.I04 In that 
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that federal legislation preempted an attempt by the state of New 
York to impose surcharges on hospital rates to certain payors.105 To-
bacco industry advocates emphasize that in describing the preempted 
state legislation, the court noted that "insurance carriers . . . other 
than the Blues, an HMO, or government insurance such as Medicaid" 
were required to pay the higher fees. 106 Though certainly not the 
opinion's major focus, this court's equating of the Medicaid program 
to private health insurance policies, the tobacco industry contends, 
demonstrates that "[c]ourts have recognized that, in providing Medi-
caid benefits to qualified residents, the State acts as a health in-
surer."I07 
Seizing upon this apparent likeness, the tobacco industry likely will 
argue that since Medicaid and the private insurance company are 
indistinguishable entities, the losses they suffer should likewise be 
treated indistinguishably.108 Thus, according to the tobacco industry, 
the general rule limiting insurers to subrogated claims against third-
party tortfeasors also should apply to the state Medicaid program in 
its attempted recovery.109 
To establish such a rule, the tobacco industry points to several cases 
for the proposition that subrogation offers the sole avenue of recovery 
for a private insurer against a third-party tortfeasor.l1o In Great 
101 See id. (citing Witherspoon, 548 P.2d at 309). 
102 See Witherspoon, 548 P.2d at 303"'{)4. 
103 Id. (quoting American Medical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp 515, 518 (N.D. Ill. 1975». 
104 Defendants' Brief Miss., supra note 96, at 12 (citing Travelers, 14 F.3d at 709). 
105 See Travelers, 14 F.3d at 711. 
106 Defendants' Brief Miss., supra note 96, at 12 (quoting Travelers, 14 F.3d at 712) (emphasis 
added). 
107 Defendants' Brief Miss., supra note 96, at 12. 
108 See id. 
109 See Defendants' Brief Minn., supra note 10, at 12. 
110 See Defendants' Brief Miss., supra note 96, at 13 (citing Great American Ins. Co. v. United 
States, 575 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (2d Cir. 1978); Williams v. Globe Indem. Co., 507 F.2d 837, 840 
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American Insurance Co. v. United States, for example, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an insurance 
company that paid a claim for damages caused by the negligence of 
United States marshals was limited to a subrogation action against 
the United States.1l1 In that case, the insurer unsuccessfully at-
tempted to file suit after the insured's two-year statute of limitations 
had expired.u2 Explaining that such late filing precluded the insurer 
from gaining any sort of recovery from the United States, the court 
stated that "the authorities and the cases unanimously hold that the 
insurer's recovery is premised exclusively upon subrogation."u3 
Because of the inherent similarity between this private insurer and 
Medicaid, the tobacco industry argues that the same rule should apply 
in the states' cases.U4 In its view, the fact that an insurer may be 
publicly, not privately, operated is a distinction insufficient to justify 
infringing upon the defendant's ability to defend any claim.u5 
2. Statutory Grants of Authority 
The tobacco industry also argues that applicable statutory schemes 
at both the federal and state level expressly limit the states' recovery 
from third-party tortfeasors to subrogation actions.U6 Addressing 
first the federal Medicaid statute and its accompanying regulations,117 
the tobacco industry claims that "[f1ederal law specifically requires 
Medicaid recipients to assign to the state any rights to payment from 
third parties for medical care."U8 It further argues that "states are 
required to enforce and implement their rights as assignees or subro-
(8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ill. 
Corp., 658 F. Supp 775, 780 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Silva v. Home Indem. Co., 416 A.2d 664, 666 (R.I. 
1980)}. 
111 See Great American, 575 F.2d at 1033. 
112 See id. 
113 See Defendants' Brief Miss., supra note 96, at 13 (quoting Great American, 575 F.2d at 
1033). The tobacco manufacturers also point to other cases in support of the same proposition. 
Williams, 507 F.2d at 840 (holding that "an insurer's rights against alleged tortfeasor 'are solely 
derivative rights of subrogation"'); National Union, 658 F. Supp. at 780 (stating that "an 
insurer's only right [against an alleged tortfeasor] is derivative as the subrogee of its insured"); 
Silva, 416 A.2d at 668 (stating that an "insured's only method of recovery against alleged 
tortfeasor arises 'if at all, on the basis of its subrogation to the rights that its insured would 
have had against [the tortfeasor]"'). 
114 Defendants' Brief Miss., supra note 96, at 14. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. at 3. 
117 42 C.F.R. § 433.146 (1995). 
118 See Defendants' Brief Miss., supra note 96, at 3. 
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gee of the Medicaid recipients."119 Medicaid authors' repeated mention 
of these assignment/subrogation rights, coupled with their sub-
sequent failure to name any other acceptable methods of recovery, 
indicate to the tobacco industry that a state's independent action was 
neither contemplated nor permissible.l20 
The exclusive mention of subrogation in statutory language is a 
weapon that the tobacco industry employs at the state level as well.l2l 
In Minnesota, where the subrogation issue has already come before a 
state trial court, the tobacco industry cites the language of a state 
Medicaid statutel22 for the proposition that any claim that the appro-
priate state agency may have against a third-party tortfeasor must 
be brought via subrogation.l23 Similarly, tobacco advocates in Missis-
119 See Defendants' Brief Minn., supra note 10, at 14-15 (referring to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396(a)(25)(1994» (emphasis added). 
120 See id. at 16. The federal Medicaid legislation to which the tobacco manufacturers refer is 
§ 1396 of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1396. Section 1396 provides, in relevant part, that 
"the States or local agency ... will take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability 
of third parties ... to pay for care and services available under the plan." [d. § 1396(a)(25)(A). 
In doing so, the state must "provide for mandatory assignment of rights of payment for medical 
support and other medical care owed to recipients, in accordance with section 1396k of this title." 
[d. § 1396(a)(45). Section 1396k then states that in order to qualify for Medicaid, an applicant 
must first "assign the State any rights ... to support ... and to payment for medical care from 
any third party." [d. § 1396k (a)(I)(A). It further orders states to require recipients to "cooper-
ate with the state" in establishing the paternity of third persons. [d. § 1396k(a)(I)(B). Finally, 
it provides that states must order recipients to "cooperate with the State in identifying and 
providing information to assist the State in pursuing, any third party who may be liable .... " 
[d. § 1396k(a)(I)(C). 
Added to the Social Security Act in 1967, § 1396(a) found its purpose in "mak[ing] certain that 
the State and the federal governments will receive proper reimbursement for medical assistance 
paid to an eligible person .... " S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1967), reprinted in 
1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2834, 3022. Congress continues that, "if ... legal liability of a third party is 
established later, the State or local agency must seek reimbursement from such party." [d. 
Enacted as part of the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, 
§ 1396k sought to ensure that Medicaid alone, and not private health care providers, would 
receive whatever rights a recipient may have against third-parties. See H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3051. Such amendments, 
Congress believed, would "strengthen the capability of the government to detect, prosecute and 
punish fraudulent activities under the ... medicaid program." See id. at 1. 
121 See Defendants' Brief Miss., supra note 96, at 3, 4. 
122 The Minnesota Medicaid statute provides that: 
Upon furnishing medical assistance to any person having private accident or health 
care coverage, or having a cause of action arising out of an occurrence that necessitated 
the payment of medical assistance, the state agency shall be subrogated, to the extent 
of the cost of the medical care furnished, to any rights the person may have under 
the terms of the coverage or under the cause of action. 
MINN. STAT. § 256B.37(1) (1993) (emphasis added). 
123 See Defendants' Brief Minn., supra note 10, at 15. 
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sippi claim that a state statutel24 specifying the procedure to be used 
in seeking reimbursement of Medicaid costs "expressly subrogates 
the Division of Medicaid (the Division) to the rights of the Medicaid 
recipient and authorizes the Division as subrogee to bring suit against 
the alleged tortfeasor."125 
To bolster its claim that this statutory language limits the state to 
subrogated claims, the tobacco industry also cites to cases espousing 
certain principles of statutory construction.126 One such case is Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad 
Passengers.127 There, as tobacco advocates point out, the United 
States Supreme Court cited the ancient maxim, "expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius"l2B to announce its opposition to the expansion of 
remedies beyond those stated in the applicable legislation.129 The 
Court was forced to decide whether the remedies created in § 307(a) 
of the Amtrak Act comprised the exclusive means to enforce the 
duties and obligations imposed by the Act.130 Taking the maxim liter-
ally as, "the expression of one is the exclusion of the other," the Court 
concluded that "[a] frequently stated principle of statutory construc-
tion is that when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy 
or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to 
124 The Mississippi Medicaid statute provides that: 
If medical assistance is provided to a recipient under this article for injuries, disease 
or sickness caused under circumstances creating a cause of action in favor of the 
recipient against any person, firm or corporation, then the division shall be entitled 
to recover the proceeds that may result from the exercise or any rights of recovery 
which the recipient may have .... The recipient shall execute and deliver instru-
ments and papers to do whatever is necessary to secure such rights and shall do 
nothing after said medical assistance is provided to prejudice the subrogation rights 
of the division. 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-13-125(1)(1993) (emphasis added). 
126 See Defendants' Brief Miss., supra note 96, at 3, 4. Though not mentioned by the tobacco 
industry, the Massachusetts Medicaid statute provides, inter alia, that, "[t]he commonwealth 
shall be subrogated to a claimant's entire cause of action or right to proceed against any third 
party .... " MAss. GEN. L. ch.U8E, § 22. The statute further specifies that if a claimant does 
not commence his or her own action against the third-party tortfeasor within nine months of 
this incident, "[the state] ... may ... commence a civil action or other proceeding on behalf of 
the commonwealth to establish the liability of any third party." [d. 
126 See Defendants' Brief Minn., supra note 10, at 16 n.13. (citing National R.R. Passenger 
Corp v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1978)). 
127 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1978). 
128 [d. 
129 See Defendants' Brief Minn., supra note 10, at 16 n.13 (citing National R.R., 414 U.S. at 
458). 
130 See National R.R., 414 U.S. at 458. 
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subsume other remedies."131 The tobacco industry is quick to apply 
this principle to current Medicaid legislation.l32 Given this "settled 
rule of construction," tobacco advocates argue that it is "inconceiv-
able" that the state legislature, in enacting a statute mentioning sub-
rogation exclusively, could have intended to endorse any other 
method of recovery.l33 
C. State Arguments 
To counter the tobacco industry's pro-subrogation arguments, the 
states take every opportunity to disassociate themselves from the 
harmed smokers, and instead characterize their suits as ones between 
the state and the tobacco industry exclusively.l34 Specifically, the 
states claim to "seek redress for the cigarette industry'S breach of 
independent duties which flowed directly from the state as a health 
care purchaser."135 In such an action, "the duty flows directly to the 
State ... not to the smokers."l36 Though a seemingly simple proposi-
tion, persuading a court to adopt such an esoteric principle inevitably 
involves rebutting arguments that Medicaid's statutory framework 
and past treatment by the courts mandate the subrogation label. To 
respond to these tobacco industry assertions, the states muster their 
own arsenal of arguments. 
1. Statutory Construction 
The states first argue that applicable Medicaid legislation does not 
limit recovery to subrogation actions, but instead offers subrogation 
as an alternative to independent recovery.137 In making this argument, 
the states first assert the axiom that "[i]t is the right of the plain-
tiffs-not defendants-to choose the manner in which they will seek 
to enforce their legal rights."l36 The United States Supreme Court 
adopted this rule in the 1912 case The Fair v. Kohler Die CO .• 139 There, 
131 [d. Tobacco advocates also cite Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 
714, 720 (1967) (stating that: "[w]hen a cause of action has been created by a statute which 
expressly provides the remedies for vindication of the cause, other remedies should not readily 
be implied."). 
132 See Defendants' Brief Minn., supra note 10, at 16. 
133 [d. 
134 Plaintiff's Brief Minn., supra note 78, at 2. 
135 [d. at 11. 
136 [d. 
137 See Plaintiffs' Brief Miss., supra note 12, at , 12. 
133 See Plaintiffs' Brief Minn., supra note 78, at 9. 
139 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1912). 
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the Court faced the question of whether the lower federal court had 
jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claim that the defendant had in-
fringed upon the plaintiff's patent rights.140 Despite finding proper 
jurisdiction existed because the plaintiffs had pled federal statutory 
violations exclusively, the Court admitted that "[o]f course the party 
who brings the suit is master to decide what law he will rely 
upon .... "141 In the eyes of the states, such a passing admission only 
reinforces the notion that when faced with a choice of remedies, a 
plaintiff should be free to choose which to pursue. 
Tailoring this general principle to the facts of their case against the 
tobacco industry, the states further argue that "[e]ven the presence 
of a statutory cause of action generally will not preclude the plaintiff 
from choosing [the manner in which] to proceed .... "142 To support 
this, the state of Minnesota points to Davis & Michel v. Great North-
ern Railway CO.143 There, the Supreme Court of Minnesota deter-
mined that an attorney seeking reimbursement for his services may 
do so in any way he chooses, despite the presence of a state statute 
delineating his rights to such reimbursement. l44 In holding that the 
attorney could choose to recover through either independent action 
or the original suit, the court reasoned that "a complaining party may 
resort to any judicial remedy for the enforcement of his rights, legal 
or equitable, which is adequate and appropriate to the relief 
sought."145 Citing this finding as support, the states conclude that 
"[u]nless there is clear statutory language making the statutory rem-
edy exclusive, it is uniquely the plaintiff's privilege to elect which 
remedy to enforce."146 To the states, a cause of action provided by a 
statute is cumulative to, not in place of, any available common law 
actions.147 
Under this principle, the states argue that, despite Medicaid's 
statutory language, states retain the right to proceed under the com-
mon law as well.148 "Although the Medicaid Law did further codify the 
140 See id. at 24. 
141 [d. at 25. Several federal courts have reiterated this principle: Brough v. United Steelwork-
ers of Am., AFL-CIO, 437 F.2d 748, 749 (1st Cir. 1971) (explaining "[i]t is also irrelevant that 
plaintiff may, in fact, have no valid state cause of action, but at best only a federal one; he is 
free to select the suit he will bring."); Vargas v. Barcelo, 435 F.2d 843, 844 (1st Cir. 1970) (stating 
"[ w]e don't know why a plaintiff may not bring what suit he wants to."). 
142 Plaintiff's Brief Minn., supra note 78, at 10. 
143 See id. at 12 (citing 151 N.W. 128, 129 (Minn. 1915». 
144 See Davis & Michel v. Great N. Ry. Co., 151 N.W. 128, 129 (Minn. 1915). 
145 [d. 
146 Plaintiff's Brief Minn., supra note 78, at 10. 
147 Plaintiff's Brief Miss., supra note 12, at ~ 12. 
148 [d. 
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State's rights to be subrogated, [that right] is in addition to, and not 
in derogation of, the State's statutory and common law remedies."149 
Disagreeing with the tobacco industry's principle of statutory con-
struction, the states instead claim that "statutes in derogation of 
sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the State."150 
Believing that state power can be "narrowed or destroyed" only by 
"specific provisions," the states argue that the ambiguity found in 
Medicaid legislation precludes any interpretation limiting their recov-
ery to subrogation.151 
As further support for their own interpretation, the states propose 
that "it is universally accepted" that statutes "should be given a 
favorable construction to the end that their manifest humanitarian 
and beneficent purpose may be effectuated to the fullest extent com-
patible with their terms."152 Given such a purpose, the states contend 
the Medicaid statute should be construed liberally so as to provide 
the states with extensive remedies.l53 In light of this apparent man-
date, the states argue that courts can only read Medicaid's statutory 
language to include an independent reimbursement action as a means 
of recovery.l54 
2. The Medical Care Recovery Act 
The states next argue that even if independent recovery rights 
under state Medicaid statutes are ambiguous on their face, examina-
tion of related federal legislation quickly resolves any such ambigu-
ity.155 Enacted to allow the federal government to recover from third-
party wrongdoers the value of medical care which is provided to 
injured persons, The Medical Care Recovery Act (MCRA),156 pro-
vides, in part: 
In any case in which the United States is authorized or required 
by law to furnish hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and 
treatment ... to a person who is injured or suffers a disease ... 
under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third per-
son ... to pay damages therefor [sic], the United States shall have 
149 [d. 
150 [d. at ~ 45. 
151 [d. (citing City of Jackson v. Mississippi State Bldg. Comm'n, 350 So. 2d 63, 64 (Miss. 1977». 
152 Plaintiff's Brief Miss., supra note 12, at ~ 46 (quoting 73 Am. Jur. 2n Statutes § 282 (1974». 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. at ~ 13l. 
156 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (1994). 
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a right to recover from said person the reasonable value of the 
care and treatment so furnished .... 157 
255 
More importantly, the statute states that "[t]he United States may, 
to enforce such a right, ... institute and prosecute legal proceedings 
against the third person ... either alone (in its own name ... ) ... or 
in conjunction with the injured or diseased person."158 
The states argue that in applying the MCRA's language, at least 
one court has found an independent right of recovery for the govern-
ment.159 In United States v. Housing Authority of the City of Bremer-
ton, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that an injured infant's negligent parents did not defeat 
the United States's independent recovery against a third-party 
wrongdoer.l60 Because "the United States has been guilty of no wrong-
doing," the court found that "the government has an independent 
right to recovery; it is not merely a subrogee."161 
For the states, this federal independent right of recovery, coupled 
with the fact that the states are required under federal law to seek 
reimbursement generally,l62 supports the conclusion that the states 
themselves also must possess such an independent right. l63 As the 
states are quick to point out, at least one court has implicitly followed 
this sort of statutory interpretation in a strikingly similar case.l64 In 
157Id. § 2651(a). 
158 Id. In enacting the MCRA, Congress cited the "several millions of dollars in costs each 
year" the government expends in caring for "certain classes of eligible persons who are injured 
as the result of negligent or wrongful acts of third persons." S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 2639 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U .S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 2639. Noting the "magnitude of potential 
recoveries" if government recovery were permitted, Congress concluded that the MCRA's 
enactment would have a strong "relation" to the "fiscal policy" of the United States. Id. at 2643. 
159 Plaintiff's Brief Miss., supra note 12, at , 133 (citing United States v. Housing Auth. of 
the City of Bremerton, 415 F.2d 239, 243 (9th Cir. 1969)). 
160 See Bremerton, 415 F.2d at 243. 
161 See id. (stating contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery by the United States 
government). Responding to the third party's claim that the parents' negligence ought to 
preclude the government's recovery, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
stated, "[t]his argument assumes that the United States is subrogated to the parents' claim so 
that it is subject to all defenses against the parents." Id. Though the court conceded that an 
injured party's negligence may affect the government's recovery, the typical policy against the 
parents' recovery-that of "profit[ing] in spite of their own wrongdoing"-did not apply. Id. 
Because the United States had committed no wrongful act, the court concluded that "the policy 
that excludes recovery by parents is inapplicable to the United States." Id. 
162 42 C.F.R. § 433.139(d)(2). Under 42 C.F.R. § 433.139(d)(2), "if the agency learns of a liable 
third party ... the agency must seek recovery of ... reimbursement .... " Id. 
163 See Plaintiff's Brief Miss., supra note 12, at , 51. 
164 See id. at , 49-50 (citing Hedgebeth v. Medford, 378 A.2d 226, 228 (N.J. 1977)). 
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Hedgebeth v. Medford, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that when 
a state exercises its right of subrogation under the state Medicaid 
program, it still must pay its pro rata share of the recipient's counsel 
fees. 165 More interesting to the states, perhaps, are the statements the 
court makes in formulating its final determination.166 In interpreting 
the state legislationl67 enabling the state to seek reimbursement via 
subrogation, the court noted, "the State has two avenues by which it 
may seek reimbursement for Medicaid payments: it may either insti-
tute an action directly against the tortfeasor who is liable for the 
medical expenses or seek recovery by way of the Medicaid recipient 
through a right of subrogation."168 To the states, such a matter-of-fact 
recognition of an independent reimbursement action only demon-
strates that it holds a position among the states' possible avenues of 
recovery. If states had no such remedy, the states would be deprived 
of a means of recovery that "it is only logical" they enj oy.169 
D. Conclusion: Affirmative Defenses Inapplicable 
Citing these similarities to federal legislation and principles of 
statutory construction, the states make the general claim that their 
actions do not invoke subrogation, but instead exercise the right to 
seek recovery independently from the tobacco industry under com-
mon law principles.170 Consequently, the states contend, the tobacco 
industry is precluded from asserting any affirmative defenses such as 
assumption of risk or contributory negligence, which have been appli-
cable in suits brought by smokers.171 Reasoning that "a plaintiff should 
not be made to account for the alleged fault of a third party in a 
manner which would benefit the wrongdoer," the states claim that, 
"[i]t is well established as a general rule that a defendant may not 
165 Hedgebeth, 378 A.2d at 232. 
166 See id. at 228. 
167 New Jersey's Medicaid statute states, in relevant part, that, "[iJn any case where such a 
legal liability is found the department shall be subrogated to the rights of the individual for 
whom medical assistance was made available." N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4D-7(j) (1988). 
168 Plaintiff's Brief Miss., supra note 12, at ~ 49 (citing Hedgebeth, 378 A.2d at 228). The New 
Jersey Supreme Court in Hedgebeth then stated that the New Jersey statute "must be read in 
pari materia . .. with the independent right of recovery specified in 42 U.S.C. § 2651." 378 A.2d 
at 228. The court later added that the statute's exclusive mention of subrogation acted as "a 
precautionary measure by the Legislature to clearly define these two routes of recovery by the 
State." [d. 
169 Plaintiff's Brief Miss., supra note 12, at ~ 51. 
170 See Plaintiff's Brief Minn., supra note 78, at 2. 
171 See id. at 13. 
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impute defenses from one person to another .... "172 As such, the 
states claim that they ought to be free to pursue their substantive 
claims against the tobacco industry without the interference of affir-
mative defenses.173 
V. THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT RECOVERY 
Considering the arguments presented by both the tobacco industry 
and the states, a court deciding this issue likely would find that 
Medicaid legislation does authorize the states to pursue independent 
recovery actions. 
First, contrary to tobacco industry claims, past cases have not only 
distinguished Medicaid from the typical private insurance policy,174 
but also have deemed statutory language generally incapable of con-
veying the true meaning of a statute ambiguous on its face. 175 Second, 
the legislative history surrounding Medicaid statutes strongly sug-
gests that Congress sought to allow the states to pursue all possible 
avenues of recovery against third-party tortfeasors.176 Third, the gov-
ernment's ability to pursue independent actions under the MCRA-
the statute perhaps most analogous to Medicaid-likewise advances 
the proposition that such actions are permissible under Medicaid.177 
Finally, the overwhelming need both to preserve Medicaid's tradi-
tional role as payor of last resort and to ensure the program's financial 
survival demands that the states have the authority to employ any 
reasonable means to recoup funds from third parties. 
A. Court-Imposed Restrictions 
1. The State as a Private Health Insurer 
Contrary to the tobacco industry's assertions that Medicaid is 
merely a private insurance policy, at least one court has distinguished 
public assistance programs like Medicaid from those offered by pri-
vate insurersp8 Even more startling is the fact that the tobacco 
172 [d. 
173 See id. at 17. 
174 See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 132--36 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra notes 156-68 and accompanying text. 
178 See Witherspoon v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 548 P.2d 302, 305 (Wash. 1976). 
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industry cites this very court to support its own opposing position.179 
In Witherspoon v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., the 
Supreme Court of Washington held that some Medicare benefits paid 
to a recipient were not "insurance," and thus did not qualify for 
exclusion under the recipient's private health insurance policy.180 
Though, as the tobacco industry is quick to point out, it did deem the 
government "the largest health insurer in the United States,"18I the 
court also presented a detailed discussion of why a section of Medicare 
strikingly similar to Medicaid does not qualify as insurance.182 Citing 
both the recipient's automatic qualification for the program upon 
reaching the age of sixty-five, and the program's financing via means 
other than recipient payments, the court found Part A of the Medicare 
program represents "disbursements made in furtherance of the social 
welfare objectives of the Federal government."I83 As such, Part A 
Medicare was a far cry from the typical private health insurance 
policy.l84 
Though probably not intended, the criteria employed by the court 
likewise distinguishes Medicaid from the private health insurance 
policy. Like Part A of the Medicare program, Medicaid automatically 
covers a well-defined group of individuals labeled "categorically 
needy."I85 The government does not have the option of whether or not 
to offer Medicaid assistance to a qualified individual.I86 As long as that 
individual meets certain financial, age, state residency, and United 
States citizenship requirements, Medicaid coverage cannot be de-
nied.187 At the same time, the source of Medicaid's funding likens it to 
Medicare's Part A in that neither program depends upon funds re-
ceived directly from recipients for financial survival.l88 Though they 
may implement a nominal "cost-sharing" provision in their Medicaid 
plans, states expressly are prohibited from imposing an "enrollment 
fee, premium, or similar charge on individuals who are categorically 
179 See id. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. at 310 (quoting American Medical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.n. 
Il!. 1975)). 
182 See id. at 305. 
183 See Witherspoon, 548 P.2d at 305. 
184 See id. In contrast, the court also found that Part B of Medicare, an additional, more 
comprehensive program financed through monthly premiums paid by recipients, "has a contract 
aspect not present in Part A" and thus is more like a private insurance policy. Id. 
185 See Medicaid Eligibility-Services, supra note 23, at , 14,251. 
186 Id. 
187Id. at , 14,311. 
188 See id. at , 14,010. 
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needy."189 Most telling is the fact that Medicaid's goal of "provid[ing] 
the nation's most vulnerable groups ... with access to health serv-
ices," most certainly fits under Part Ns mission of furthering the 
government's social welfare objectives.l90 Indeed, Medicaid's striking 
similarity to Part A Medicare in both its overall purpose and specific 
mechanics only supports the conclusion that the court would find it, 
as it did with Part A, distinguishable from private insurance.l9l Con-
sequently, the court need not limit Medicaid recovery to subrogation 
actions. For although courts traditionally have limited private insur-
ers' actions against third-party tortfeasors to subrogation actions, the 
fundamental differences between Medicaid and private insurers-as 
highlighted by the Witherspoon court-make any court-imposed limi-
tation on Medicaid recovery unlikely on these grounds.192 
2. Principles of Statutory Construction 
Just as courts' past treatment of Medicaid frees it from the subro-
gation restriction, judicially created principles of statutory construc-
tion do not necessarily limit Medicaid recovery to subrogation actions. 
To illustrate, consider the Massachusetts Medicaid reimbursement 
provision, which provides that, "[t]he commonwealth shall be subro-
gated to a claimant's entire cause of action or right to proceed against 
any third party . . . ."193 Citing the United States Supreme Court's 
opinion in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Associa-
tion of Railroad Passengers, the tobacco industry claims that the 
exclusive mention of subrogation in the Massachusetts Medicaid stat-
ute necessarily prohibits the state from employing any other means 
of recovery.l94 
189 See id. at ~ 14,731. In contrast, Medicare's Part B-a program the Witherspoon court 
assimilated to a private health insurance policy-relies almost exclusively on monthly premiums 
collected from the recipients themselves. See Medicaid Eligibility-Services, supra note 23, at 
'3,010. 
190 See De Lew, supra note 24, at 263. 
. 191 See Witherspoon v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 548 P.2d 302, 305 (Wash. 1976). 
, 192 See id. The other case the tobacco industry relies upon, Travelers, likewise supports this 
conclusion. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1993). Though the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did, in passing, label Medicaid as "government 
insurance," its focus lay with a statute prohibiting unnecessary fees or charges on any "approved 
health benefits plan." Id. Because of this inclusive phrasing, the statute necessarily applied to 
both Medicaid and private insurance. Id. The fact that the court mentions the two separately 
demonstrates its interpretation that the two are distinguishable. 
193 MAss. GEN. L. ch. U8E, § 22 (1993). 
194 See Defendant's Brief Minn., supra note 10, at 16 n.13 (citing National R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1978)). 
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Much like its assertions regarding the government's role as a health 
insurer, the tobacco industry's supporting case here tends to endorse 
not its own position regarding subrogation, but that of the states.195 
In National Railroad, the United States Supreme Court faced the 
issue of whether the Amtrak Act's explicit authorization of state-
brought suits precluded private individuals from suing to enforce the 
obligations imposed by the Act. l96 Holding that the Act did preclude 
such private suits, the Court initially cited "expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius" for the proposition that courts ought not expand 
remedies beyond those stated in applicable legislation.197 In its final 
reasoning, however, the Court placed little importance on this 
maxim.l98 Stating that "[e]ven the most basic principles of statutory 
construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative in-
tent," the Court engaged in a detailed examination of the Act's other 
provisions and general legislative history.199 Though this examination 
did produce a result consistent with the maxim, the Court stated 
emphatically that where a statute's language is unclear, finding its 
true meaning may depend on "evident legislative intent."200 
The factual similarities between National Railroad and the states' 
cases against the tobacco industry suggest that a court may be equally 
cautious in interpreting a state's Medicaid statute.201 For, in essence, 
the two cases present the same question: whether a statute's explicit 
mention of one means of recovery against a wrongdoer prohibits the 
employment of alternative means. As in National Railroad, a court 
will likely treat any conclusion drawn from the ancient maxim not as 
dispositive, but as only an initial clue as to what the Medicaid statute's 
true meaning may be.202 To be certain, the judicially created maxim 
does not mandate that subrogation be the state's sole means of recov-
ery under Medicaid.203 Rather, it merely offers a starting point for a 
more comprehensive analysis.204 
195 See National R.R., 414 U.S. at 458 (stating legislative history and intent of legislation 
trump statutory construction). 
196 See id. at 457. 
197 I d. at 458. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. at 458--61. 
200 See National R.R., 414 U.S. at 458. 
201 See id. at 457. 
202 See id. at 458. 
203 See id. 
204 See id. 
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B. Legislative Intent 
1. Federal Medicaid Legislation: 42 U.S.C. § 1396 
a. Section 1396(a)(25)(A) 
The National Railroad Court instructs that the absence of clear 
statutory language mandates that such a comprehensive analysis be-
gin with an examination of legislative history.205 The states' authority 
to recover from third-party tortfeasors is less than clear in Federal 
Medicaid legislation.206 Section 1396 provides only that "the State or 
local agency . . . will take all reasonable measures to ascertain the 
legal liability of third parties ... to pay for care and services available 
under the plan."207 In doing so, the state must "provide for mandatory 
assignment of rights of payment for medical support and other medi-
cal care owed to recipients, in accordance with § 1396k of this sec-
tion."208 Section 1396k states that to qualify for Medicaid, an individual 
must first "assign the State any rights . . . to support ... and to 
payment for medical care from any third party."209 Though clearly 
empowering the state to seek reimbursement from third parties via 
assignment or subrogation, the Act is silent regarding the state's 
ability to recover in an independent action.210 
Closer examination of the Act's legislative background, however, 
reveals that § 1396 was by no means inserted to limit the state's 
possible avenues of recovery.211 Rather, its general aim was to ensure 
that third parties fully compensate the state for injuries to Medicaid 
recipients.212 A 1967 United States Senate Report outlined § 1396's 
purpose as "mak[ing] certain that the State and federal governments 
will receive proper reimbursement for medical assistance paid to an 
eligible person .... "213 To ensure the states fulfill their role, the Re-
port later commands that "if . . . legal liability of a third party is 
established later, the States or local agency must seek reimbursement 
205 See National R.R., 414 U.S. at 458. 
206 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(25)(A) (1994). 
207Id. 
208Id. § 1396(a)(45). 
209 Id. § 1396k(a)(1)(A). 
210 See id. § 1396(a). 
211 See S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2834, 
3022 (emphasis added). 
212 See id. 
213Id. 
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from such party."214 Such a strict, sudden command to collect from 
third-party tortfeasors, where no such provision previously existed, 
illustrates that the resulting provision was Congress's desperate at-
tempt to relieve itself of the Medicaid program's financial burden.215 
As such, it is unlikely that in enacting § 1396 Congress intended to 
place any sort of limitation on the attainment of that relief. It is more 
likely that § 1396 sought to guarantee that the states pursue all 
possible avenues to recover from third-party tortfeasors.216 
b. Section 1396k(a)(1)(A) 
The legislative history surrounding another key provision of the 
Act likewise supports this conclusion that § 1396 sought to broaden, 
not restrict, states' recovery.217 Under § 1396k(a)(1)(A), states must 
require Medicaid applicants to assign to the states any rights they 
may have against third parties.218 First added to the Social Security 
Act in 1977, this provision forces states to obtain recipients' consent 
to pursue subrogation actions where possible.219 When viewed in the 
context of the surrounding provisions, it becomes clear that Congress 
intended not to limit states' possible methods of recovery, but merely 
to ensure that the Medicaid recipient fully supports any subrogation 
action states may choose to pursue.220 Provisions immediately follow-
ing the Act support this conclusion.221 Section 1396k(a)(1)(B), for ex-
ample, orders states to require recipients to "cooperate with the 
State" in establishing the paternity of third persons.222 Similarly, 
§ 1396k(a)(1)(C) provides that states must order recipients "to coop-
erate with the State in identifying and providing information to assist 
the State in pursuing, any third party who may be liable .... "223 
These provisions demonstrate that § 1396(k)'s focus regard-
ing third-party recovery actions lies not with states' restrictions, 
but rather with recipients' duties.224 Read in this context, 
§ 1396k(a)(1)(A)'s aim can hardly be characterized as delineating the 
214 I d. at 185. 
215 See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(25)(A) (1994). 
216 See S. REP. No. 744, at 185. 
217 See H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1977). 
218 See Medicaid Eligibility-Services, supra note 23, at , 14,749. 
219 See id. at, 14,749.30. 
220 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396k (a)(I)(A)-(C). 
221 See id. 
222 Id. § 1396k(a)(1)(B). 
223 Id. § 1396k(a)(I)(C). 
224 See id. § 1396k(a)(I)(A)-(C). 
1996] RECOVERY AGAINST TOBACCO INDUSTRY 263 
exclusive means by which states may recoup from wrongdoers. 
Rather, as § 1396's introductory provision points out, it seeks to assist 
"in the collection of medical support payments and other payments."225 
As Congress most likely realized in crafting § 1396k(a)(1)(A), such 
assistance occurs when states have more, rather than fewer, means 
by which to recover from third-party tortfeasors.226 
Along with ensuring recipient cooperation in third-party recover-
ies Congress, in enacting § 1396k, also sought to curb the growing 
abuse of Medicaid within the health care community.227 Enacted as 
part of the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments 
of 1977, § 1396k sought to stop a practice by which physicians reas-
signed their Medicare and Medicaid receivables for a percentage of 
their face value, submitted claims, and then received inflated pay-
ments from the government.228 Labeling this practice "factoring," 
Congress enacted § 1396k to guarantee that Medicaid alone (and not 
health care providers) would receive whatever rights the recipient 
may have against third parties.229 This exclusive right, Congress be-
lieved, would stop the activities which "cheat the taxpayers who must 
ultimately bear the financial burden of misuse of funds in any govern-
ment-sponsored program."230 Though somewhat "politically" worded, 
such a proclamation illustrates that in granting the government sub-
rogation rights, Congress sought not to limit states' enforcement 
powers, but instead to "strengthen the capability of the government 
to detect, prosecute, and punish fraudulent activities under the . . . 
Medicaid program .... "231 
226 See 42 u.s.c. § 1396k(a). 
226 See id. § 1396k(a)(I)(A). To further aid states in collecting funds from third parties, Con-
gress slightly amended § 1396 as part of its Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. Prior to 1984, § 1396 
(a)(I)(A) provided that states were permitted to require assignment by potential recipients. S. 
REP. No. 169, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1417. The 1984 
amendments modified the assignment provision, providing that "§ 1396 would mandate that 
states require such assignment." [d. In doing so, Congress cited the 14.5% increase in Medicaid 
benefit payments from 1984 to 1985. [d. at 87. Placed alongside sections of the bill extending 
the reduction in federal matching payments to the states, this provision demonstrates Con-
gress's desire to decrease federal spending on Medicaid, and instead increase its funding via 
sources outside the government. [d. 
227 H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1977) (discussing fraud and abuse in govern-
ment medical benefit programs). 
228 See id. at 48. 
229 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396k (a)(I)(A); H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977). 
Medicaid's exclusive possession of assignment rights would thus prevent health care providers 
from ever initiating claims against third parties themselves. See H.R. REP. No. 393, at 49. 
230 See id. at 44. 
231 See id. at 1. Courts applying § 1396k have already recognized its goal of preventing health 
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C. Medical Care Recovery Act 
1. Striking Similarities to Medicaid Legislation 
Along with statutory construction principles and legislative history, 
analogous statutory provisions may prove to be helpful tools in deter-
mining the true meaning of the Medicaid legislation. Specifically, 
courts' treatment of independent government recovery attempts 
stemming from other statutory authority may shed some light on 
whether such recovery is appropriate under Medicaid. Of this other 
authority, perhaps none is more analogous than the MCRA.232 Enacted 
in 1962, the MCRA is virtually indistinguishable from § 1396 in both 
its purpose and statutory language.233 This similarity, considered in 
light of the courts' consistent endorsement of the federal govern-
ment's independent recovery right under the MCRA, demonstrates 
that a similar endorsement is likewise appropriate under Medicaid.234 
To support such a conclusion, a court first might note that the two 
statutes share the same underlying purpose. The MCRA creates a 
right on the part of the government to recover in cases where the 
United States "is authorized or required by law to furnish hospital, 
medical, surgical or dental care and treatment ... to a person who is 
injured . . . under circumstances creating tort liability upon some 
third person .... "235 In enacting the MCRA, it appears that Congress 
was driven by the same fiscal concerns that spurred the inclusion of 
§ 1396 into the Social Security Act.236 Specifically, Congress cited the 
"several millions of dollars in costs each year" the government ex-
pends in caring for "certain classes of eligible persons who are injured 
as the result of negligent or wrongful acts of third persons."237 Noting 
care fraud. See Evanston Hosp. v. Hauck, 1 F.3d 540, 543 (7th Cir. 1993). In Evanston, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that in requiring indigent recipients to 
assign their rights to the government, Congress conveyed its "intent that state Medicaid 
agencies, not hospitals and or doctors, seek reimbursement from third parties .... " [d. 
232 See 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (1994). 
233 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 1396. 
234 See United States v. Housing Auth. of the City of Bremerton, 415 F.2d 239, 243 (9th Cir. 
1969). 
235 See 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a). 
236 See S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2637 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2637,2637. 
237 See id. at 2639. This concern stems from the recommendations of the Comptroller General 
in his report to Congress, dated May 6,1960, entitled, "Review of the Government's Rights and 
Practices Concerning Recovery of the Cost of Hospital and Medical Services in N egJigent Third 
Party Cases." [d. That report, in turn, was inspired by the holding in United States v. Standard 
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the "magnitude of potential recoveries" if government recovery were 
permitted, Congress concluded that the MCRA's enactment would 
have a strong "relation" to the "fiscal policy" of the United States.238 
Thus, like § 1396, it appears that the MCRA was created largely as a 
revenue-enhancing, cost-saving measure for the government. 
Likewise, a court may realize that the precise means by which the 
MCRA grants the government the right to recover from third parties 
closely resembles that ordered to the states by § 1396.239 In fact, the 
MCRA's reimbursement provision contains language nearly identical 
to Massachusetts's Medicaid recovery provision.240 Section 2651(a) 
provides, in relevant part, "the United States shall have a right to 
recover from said third person the reasonable value of the care and 
treatment so furnished or to be furnished and shall, as to this right 
be subrogated to any right or claim that the injured or diseased 
person . . . has against such third person."241 Where the injured/dis-
eased individual has not commenced his or her own action within six 
months of treatment, the government may "institute and prosecute 
legal proceedings against the third person who is liable for the in-
jury."242 Such limited circumstances under which the government may 
act, coupled with this exclusive mention of subrogation as a means of 
enforcement, make the MCRA a mirror-image of the legislation en-
acted pursuant to § 1396.243 
2. MCRA's Independent Right of Recovery 
Given the two statutes' similarities in both purpose and construc-
tion, courts' treatment of one logically should have some effect on the 
Oil o/California. [d. (citing 332 U.S. 301, 304 (1947». In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the federal government could not recover the costs of hospitalization and soldier's pay it 
expended as the result of the injury to a soldier hit by a truck negligently driven by a third 
person. See Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 304. 
238 See S. REP. No. 1945, at 2640, 2643. 
239 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2651 with 42 U.S.C. § 1396. 
240 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) with MAss. GEN. L. ch. U8E § 22 (1993). The Massachusetts 
Medicaid statute provides, in relevant part, that, "[t]he commonwealth shall be subrogated to 
a claimant's entire cause of action or right to proceed against any third party." MAss. GEN. L. 
ch. U8E, § 22 (emphasis added). It later specifies that if a claimant does not commence his own 
action against a third-party tortfeasor within nine months of the incident, "[t]he division ... 
may ... commence a civil action or other proceeding on behalf of the commonwealth to establish 
the liability of any third party .... " [d. 
24142 U.S.C. § 2651(a). 
242 [d. § 2651(b). 
243 See id.; MAss. GEN. L. ch.U8E, § 22. 
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potential treatment of the other. Regarding the MCRA, courts con-
sistently have found that the statute's language grants the govern-
ment an independent right to seek reimbursement from third-party 
tortfeasors-even in cases where the third party was not the lone 
wrongdoer.244 In United States v. Housing Authority of the City of 
Bremerton, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that the government could recover medical expenses from a third 
party which the government spent on the injured infant, despite the 
contributory negligence of the infant's parents.245 Responding to the 
claim that the parents' negligence ought to preclude government 
recovery, the court stated, "[t]his argument assumes that the United 
States is subrogated to the parents' claim so that it is subject to all 
the defenses against the parents."246 The court continued, "the gov-
ernment has an independent right to recovery; it is not merely a 
subrogee."247 Though the court conceded that an injured party's neg-
ligence may affect the government's recovery, the typical policy 
against the parents' recovery, that of "profit[ting] in spite of their own 
wrongdoing," simply does not apply.24s Because "the United States has 
been guilty of no wrongdoing," the court concluded that "the policy 
that excludes recovery by the parents is inapplicable to the United 
States."249 Thus, despite the negligence of those intimately associated 
with the injured party, the court did not waiver in its interpretation 
of the MCRA.250 Such a conclusion demonstrates not only the court's 
recognition of the government's financial losses as distinct from the 
physical injuries of the individual, but also its willingness to look 
beyond supposedly exclusive language to find a means to recoup those 
losses. 
244 See United States v. Housing Auth. of the City of Bremerton, 415 F.2d 239, 243 (9th Cir. 
1969). 
245 [d. 
246 [d. 
247 [d. 
248 See id. 
249 See Bremerton, 415 F.2d at 243. The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Arkansas in Cox v. Maddux, reached a similar conclusion. See 255 F. Supp. 517, 524 (E.D. 
Ark. 1966). There, the court found that the government could recover medical expenses from a 
negligent driver for the injuries he caused to the passenger of another vehicle. See id. Spe-
cifically, the court held that the government's right to recover for the injuries sustained by a 
passenger was "not affected," even by the negligence of the driver. See id. 
250 See Bremerton, 415 F.2d at 243. 
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3. Making the Analogy: Hedgebeth v. Medford 
This endorsement of the government's right to recover inde-
pendently under the MCRA suggests that such a right likewise ought 
to exist in the Medicaid setting.251 Actually, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in Hedgebeth v. Medford has already determined that such an 
endorsement does just that.252 Though its holding focused on a differ-
ent issue, the court found that New Jersey Medicaid legislation253 
authorized the state to either "institute an action directly against the 
tortfeasor . . . or seek recovery by way of the Medicaid recipient 
through a right of subrogation."254 In doing so, the court relied largely 
on Medicaid's similarity to the MCRA, stating that the ambiguous 
language of New Jersey's statute "must be read in pari materia255 
with the ... independent right of recovery specified" in the MCRA.256 
The court's heavy reliance upon the MCRA in reaching its conclusion 
demonstrates that simply by comparing Medicaid legislation to the 
MCRA, an independent right of recovery is an option for the state.257 
The court's further conclusion that the Medicaid statute included 
subrogation as merely "a precautionary measure by the Legislature 
to clearly define these two routes of recovery by the State," demon-
strates that independent recovery is such an obvious option that it 
does not even warrant explicit mention in the statute.258 Indeed, as 
the Hedgebeth court itself recognized, treatment of the MCRA's inde-
pendent recovery rights necessarily plays a vital role in determining 
the extent of those rights under Medicaid. 
251 See id.; Cox, 255 F. Supp. at 524. 
252 See Hedgebeth v. Medford, 378 A.2d 226, 228 (N.J. 1977). 
253 Strikingly similar to the Massachusetts legislation, the New Jersey statute provides that 
"in any case where such a legal Jiability is found, the department ... shall be subrogated to the 
rights of the individual for whom medical assistance was made available." N.J. REV. STAT. 
§ 30:4D-7(j) (1988). 
254 See Hedgebeth, 378 A.2d at 228. 
265 Meaning "Of the same material; on the same subject; as, laws pari materia must be 
construed with reference to each other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1115 (6th ed. 1990). 
256 See Hedgebeth, 378 A.2d at 228. The New Jersey Supreme Court also cites state legislative 
history to support its interpretation of the New Jersey statute. See id. Specifically, the court 
states that although "the legislative history of our own statute contains no reference to this 
independent right of recovery ... the concern for costs of the program ... suggests an unmis-
takable intent to afford the state every opportunity to recoup its payments from third parties." 
[d. 
257 See id. 
258 See id. 
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D. Policy Considerations 
Finally, public policy dictates that states have the authority to 
pursue independent reimbursement actions under the Medicaid stat-
ute.259 The driving policy considerations, however, may not be the ones 
that initially come to mind in the tobacco liability setting. The true 
policy goals supporting independent recovery do not involve punish-
ing the supposedly "evil" tobacco manufacturers for the harms they 
already have caused, but instead involve preserving the Medicaid 
program for the harms it continues to remedy. 
To garner support for its attempt to recover independently from 
the tobacco industry, the states have thus far sought to characterize 
the industry's behavior as worthy of severe punishment.260 Having 
deemed cigarettes the "poisonous product peddled by tobacco giants 
through allegedly deceptive means,"261 the states continually point to 
smoking's tremendous impact on human health and the tobacco indus-
try's subsequent windfall at the expense of the states.262 In seeking to 
generate public contempt for this windfall, states have in effect re-
sorted to mere emotion-hoping that somehow a court's hatred for 
the tobacco industry will persuade it to overlook supposedly clear 
statutory language and thus allow an independent reimbursement 
action. 
Though an effective tool, remedying this unjust windfall may not 
provide sufficient impetus for creating statutory precedent having 
such far-reaching, long-lasting effects. The real impetus instead may 
be preserving the Medicaid program and its intended role in Ameri-
can health care. "The ultimate goal of Medicaid," the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts recently wrote, "is that the program be the 
payer of last resort, that is, other available resources must be used 
before Medicaid pays for the care of an individual enrolled in the 
Medicaid program."263 The overwhelming need to further this goal, 
the court concluded, is what spurred the federal government to re-
quire states to take "all reasonable measures" in ascertaining the legal 
liability of third-party tortfeasors.264 To be certain, one such measure 
259 Shweiri v. Commonwealth, 622 N.E.2d 612, 614 (Mass. 1993) (citing S. REP. No. 146, 99th 
Congress, 2d. Sess. 312 (1986» (discussing Medicaid's traditional role as payor of last resort). 
260 See Kelder, supra note 5, at 1. 
261 See id. 
262 See Plaintiff's Complaint Mass., supra note 15, at 7-9, 72. 
263 Shweiri, 622 N.E.2d at 614 (citing S. REP. No. 146, 99th Congress, 2d. Sess. 312 (1986». 
264 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a)(25)(A». 
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guaranteed to further Medicaid's "last resort" goal is that of inde-
pendent reimbursement actions. Authorizing states to file suits inde-
pendent of the right of indigent citizens would provide another layer 
of protection between skyrocketing health care costs and the Medi-
caid program. In contrast, prohibiting such suits would force Medicaid 
to continue paying for harms for which another party may be legally 
responsible. Though certainly favorable to those parties, such unwar-
ranted payments undoubtedly offend the premise upon which the 
entire Medicaid program was founded. 
More importantly, violating this intended role of Medicaid as "payor 
of last resort" may endanger the program's very existence. The bur-
den Medicaid has borne in helping those whose health needs are 
greater than the general population has left it in a tenuous financial 
position, to say the least.265 Increases in both types of illnesses covered 
and numbers of participating individuals has caused a rapid spending 
growth that simply has outpaced that of federal, state and local reve-
nues.266 Consequently, these governments have had to spend dispro-
portionate amounts of their annual budgets simply to keep the pro-
gram operating.267 Despite such valiant efforts to sustain Medicaid, 
the breaking point is near. To alleviate the unreasonable burden on 
the government, every possible avenue of financial support must be 
made available. One such avenue is the state's independent reim-
bursement action against third-party tortfeasors. In short, inde-
pendent action would provide the state with a means of recovering 
for losses suffered apart from those suffered by Medicaid recipients. 
Though seemingly trivial, funds received from parties like the tobacco 
industry may collectively make the difference in preserving the pro-
gram that has played so vital a role in American health care. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Medicaid's ability to provide health care to millions of Americans 
who otherwise would receive none depends largely on its ability to 
remain financially independent. Contrary to the assertions made by 
the tobacco industry, § 1396 of the Social Security Act was structured 
with this in mind. Though the Act fails to mention explicitly the states' 
ability to seek reimbursement independently from third-party tort-
266 See Rowland, supra note 21, at 271. 
266 See De Lew, supra note 24, at 263. 
267 See id. 
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feasors, legislative history surrounding the Act illustrates Congress's 
profound interest in expanding, not limiting, the states' avenues of 
financial recovery. Recognizing this interest in a strikingly similar 
setting, courts already have deemed that the statute most analogous 
to § 1396, the MCRA, implicitly allows the government to seek inde-
pendent recovery. Considering this ringing endorsement in light of 
Medicaid's precarious financial position, the states' ability to pursue 
independent reimbursement actions becomes not only one which 
sound legal analysis mandates, but also one upon which American 
health care depends.268 
268 At the time of this Comment's publication, at least one court has decided the subrogation 
issue in tobacco litigation. On September 17, 1996, a Florida trial court ordered that the state 
of Florida may pursue an independent cause of action against the tobacco industry to recover 
lost Medicaid funds only in limited circumstances. Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No. CL-95-
1466 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 1996) (order granting, in part, defendants' motion to dismiss; order 
denying, in part, defendants' motion to dismiss and order to parties to conduct further media-
tion). Specifically, the Florida Circuit Court for Palm Beach County ruled that independent 
recovery is appropriate regarding only those financial harms the state suffered since its enact-
ment of the Third Party Medicaid Liability Act of 1994. [d. at 2. As for harms suffered prior to 
the 1994 legislation, the court concluded that "there can be absolutely no question" that no 
independent cause of action exists for the state. [d. Instead, the court continued, "the State may 
pursue subrogation, assignment and/or lien regarding any and all damages occurring prior to 
the 1994 amendments." [d. at 3. 
In addition, the following states/localities had, at the time of this Comment's publication, filed 
independent recovery actions against the tobacco industry: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Kan-
sas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, Okla-
homa, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and San Francisco, California. 
